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Abstract 
 
The bargaining power of international banks is currently still very high as compared to what it 
was at the time of the Bretton Woods conference. As a consequence, systemic financial crises 
are likely to remain recurrent phenomena with large effects on macroeconomic aggregates. 
Mainstream macroeconomic models dealing with financial frictions failed to explain at least 
eight features of the ongoing crisis. We therefore suggest two complementary assumptions: (I) 
A systemic bankruptcy risk stable equilibrium may be feasible, besides another stable 
equilibrium related to a stability corridor, (II) inefficient financial markets rarely ensure that 
the price of an asset is equal to its “fundamental long term value”. Both assumptions are 
compatible with a structural research programme taking into account the Lucas' critique 
(1976) but may start a creative destruction process of the Lucas' view of business cycles 
theory. 
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Introduction 
 
The current worldwide financial and economic crisis encourages revolutionary thinking in the 
field of macroeconomics and finance, e.g. in places such as the “Institute for New Economic 
Thinking” launched recently. There is scope for changing the research agenda of 
macroeconomic business cycles and growth theory. Besides these declarations of intent, 
where are we today? This paper highlights selected issues. 
  
The first issue concerns the regulation of international finance. Today’s capital markets are 
much less regulated than capital markets in the period from 1945 to 1973. This is identified as 
one of the reasons for a higher frequency of financial crises. Do conditions exist that may lead 
to a great reversal of weakly regulated to strongly regulated international financial markets? 
Our analysis suggests that the bargaining power of international banks is currently too strong 
so that we will not observe a great reversal in the near future. As a consequence, weakly 
regulated international capital markets are likely to persist in the next decades. This implies a 
high probability of financial crises leading to worldwide recessions that can be very costly in 
terms of welfare. For this reason, macroeconomics theory has to deal with weakly regulated 
international capital markets, allowing for systematically erroneous valuation of assets (the 
efficient asset market hypothesis is not valid). 
The best theoretical models available before the crisis dealing with imperfect capital markets 
were “financial accelerator” dynamic general stochastic equilibrium models (Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), 
Iacoviello (2005)). These models took bankruptcy costs and credit rationing for non-financial 
firms and, some of them, for banking firms into account. They assumed that debt is backed by 
the future valuation of collateral. However, they maintained the assumption that collateral is 
valued according to its fundamental value. In other words, they assume imperfect capital 
markets along with an efficient financial market hypothesis. The second issue of our paper is 
then to analyse these models with respect to their capacity to deal with the ongoing financial 
crisis. We found eight characteristics of the current crisis that could not be explained by the 
financial accelerator model 
The third question asks which assumptions have to be changed if one really wants to do a 
revolution in mainstream macroeconomics. We identified two major complementary 
assumptions to remove: (I) Only the locally stable equilibrium without systemic bankruptcy 
risk matters; then the confidence or liquidity crisis second equilibrium with systemic 
bankruptcy risk is completely neglected, (II) under the efficient financial market hypothesis 
the price of an asset is always equal to its fundamental value; then valuation errors are not 
possible. These two assumptions are complementary in the sense that a higher volatility of 
asset prices leads to a higher volatility of leverage and of investment, which increases the 
probability to shift to the second systemic risk equilibrium. 
In the current macroeconomic modelling, the efficient market hypothesis is related to 
auxiliary assumptions: (II-b) The no-Ponzi-game condition states that the growth rate of 
public and private debt has always to be below the real interest rate, (II-c) the linearization 
around the equilibrium of the unique stable path leads to a unique long term equilibrium, 
reducing the study of macroeconomics dynamics to qualitatively similar responses of 
macroeconomic variables to shocks; structural instability is excluded by assumption.  
Relaxing these assumptions is compatible with a structural research programme that takes into 
account the Lucas’ critique (1976), but may start a creative destruction process of the Lucas' 
view of business cycles theory. It is briefly sketched that the ongoing macroeconomics 
research may be a first step in this direction. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In a first section we discuss the problem of 
financial regulation. The second section analyses the shortcomings of the dynamic stochastic 
equilibrium model. In the third section we give an outline how to change the underlying 
assumptions of a research programme that is able to deal with financial crises. A last section 
concludes. 
  
1. “It” can happen again tomorrow 
 
1.1. A “great reversal” in the regulation of international finance? 
In order to get an idea of what is to be expected to change in the real economy in the two 
decades following the crisis we distinguish two regimes of financial regulation: a weakly 
regulated financial system and a strongly regulated financial system. These regimes exhibit a 
number of stylized facts. 
Weakly regulated International Finance (regime A): Governments do not impose 
restrictions on international capital movements. Then, international inter-bank capital 
flows, and offshore finance may lead to widespread opacity: 
- A1. International banks trading international assets have balance sheets which contain 
items with a value that is not only highly uncertain, but far from its fundamental value. 
The risk of those assets is not correctly priced. The share of these assets is large. 
- A2. International banks may use offshore finance to hide profits (tax evasion) or to 
hide losses (soft budget constraint).  
- A3. An increase in off-balance sheet activities exposes banks to default risks that bear 
the danger of not being assessed correctly. 
- A4. Banks have incentives to take huge risks due to the bail out by governments for 
banks which are too large and too interconnected. Then, banks remain highly-
leveraged in a weakly-regulated financial system. 
A1, A2, A3 and A4 lead to a larger probability of expectation driven loss-of-confidence 
systemic crises, in particular among banks, since banks are more aware of the risk of other 
banks than depositors. An under-estimated feature of the current crisis is the persistence 
of the lack of trust between banks. There is a naive belief that this trust will be quickly 
restored at the same time than GDP growth reappears, which would signal the exit of the 
crisis for the real economy. But this lack of trust is related to a persistent unreliability of 
the valuation of several items in banks balance sheet, which is not perfectly correlated 
with GDP growth. We would expect a major crisis once every three normal business 
cycles of 8 years. 
- Remark 1: universal banks doing retail banking and financial market operations are 
likely to increase the risk of transmission of bubbles on asset prices to the real 
economy, through a credit channel. Capital gains and capital losses on the equity 
market would be linked to simultaneous increases (or respectively) decreases of retail 
credit. 
- Remark 2: In this context, government owned banks that are allowed to do 
international finance are likely to speculate in the same way as privately owned banks, 
because it is too easy to make profits and losses in the same manner as their privately 
owned competitors. 
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The benefit of this regime is a potential better allocation of capital at the international 
level, along with the drawback of a higher probability of systemic risk at the world level.  
 
Strongly regulated international finance (regime B): Governments impose restrictions on 
international capital movements. This includes the control of international capital flows of 
large international banks, the control of issuing securities, and the control of the amount of 
credit by large retail banks in order to limit bubbles at the national level, when this amount 
of credit is “too high” or “too low” for small and medium size firms or for households 
(strong macro-prudential policy). This means that the involvement of government in the 
decisions for the allocation of capital is large.  
The drawback of the strong regulation regime B may be a misallocation of capital at the 
international level, along with the benefit of a lower probability of the contagion of crisis 
and of systemic risk at the world level. 
The shift from regime A to regime B is a “great reversal” as described by Rajan and Zingales 
(2003), similar to the one which followed Bretton Woods from 1945-1973 with respect to the 
period 1870-1940.  
 
1.2. A weak bargaining power of international banking in 1945.  
The main task after the Second World War was the rebuilding of the destroyed economies. In 
this context, at a conference organized in Bretton Woods in 1944, future institutional 
arrangements for the world economy and financial regulation were fixed. Some conditions 
favouring regime B after 1945, thus leading to a “great reversal” are:  
- Immediate post-war economy, with a strong government stake in the allocation of 
capital. 
- Future reconstruction plans with a strong government stake in the allocation of capital 
(Marshall Plan Aid), along with a competition with the Soviet Union economic 
system. 
- Capitalism in immediate search of stable arrangements with wage-earners, with a 
weak influence of the owners of capital. 
- International banking in shambles in several countries due to war and destruction. 
- Political consensus to keep a regime of fixed exchange rates. 
Already in the interwar period a number of other developments were observed that supported 
a “great reversal” in the relative bargaining power of international banking and finance in the 
world economy.  
- International capital flows decreased and were under government supervision.  
- International trade decreased widely. 
- Government stakes in the banking sector in the allocation of capital remained large in 
a number of countries (e.g. France, Japan, and Germany).  
- A large stake of the private banking sector was confined to the national retail banking 
activity, while facing effective direct credit control in France up to 1983, facing the 
competition of nationalized financial institutions for deposits (Japan post office), 
facing regulatory walls against cross state banking in the U.S. and against universal 
banking with the Banking Act and the Glass Steagall Act (1933), that separated the 
activities of retail banking and the securities industry. 
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As a consequence of the Bretton Woods agreement, relatively few financial crises occurred in  
the period 1945-1973, as recorded for example by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Strong 
regulation and weak bargaining power of the financial sector, may serve, therefore, as a key 
explanation of the low frequency of world financial crises over the last one hundred years. A 
world financial crisis may last a decade. The gap between 1929 and 2007 suggested that the 
frequency was one world crisis every eight decades. However, three decades are related to be 
Bretton Woods period (1945-1973). Any computation of a probability of occurrence of world 
financial crisis has to deal with the relative bargaining power of international finance with 
respect to governments and to wage earners, in particular in its ability to limit the control of 
international capital flows and maintain a large degree of opacity on those international 
capital flows.  
1.3. A strong bargaining power of international banking in 2012.  
Today, the pre-conditions of the Bretton Woods era, which were already limiting the 
bargaining power of international banking before the agreement was made, are obviously not 
met. The current economic and geo-political context is totally different from the immediate 
post World War II context of Bretton Woods in 1945. The balance of power between 
international finance, government and wage earners will remain in favour of international 
finance, helped by the usual international coordination problems between governments and 
jurisdictions.    
For this reason, the G20 is currently unable to foster influential reforms limiting effectively 
the power of international finance. Government control of international capital flows and the 
aim to decrease their opacity (fighting against offshore finance) and the control of credit 
aggregate (which is the true objective of the euphemized “macro-prudential regulation”) are 
words which are not likely to be backed by political decisions. As such, the Dodd Frank Act, 
the Basel III agreements are much less radical than the Banking Act in 1933 in the United 
States. What is more, much of the upcoming proposed policies related to macro-prudential 
regulation are to be implemented for the next boom whereas the crisis is not yet finished. In 
particular, several proposals intend to control credit aggregates and bubbles on asset prices in 
order to limit over-lending. 
Hence, international banking and finance will be in a position to maintain a non negligible 
probability of another worldwide financial and economic crisis in the next twenty years. So “it 
is likely to happen again”, with a much higher frequency than having to wait seventy years for 
the third worldwide financial and economic crisis, along with a large output and welfare loss 
due to another depression of the world economy. 
What is more, governments may need the support of bubbles in emerging markets (China and 
India) or on commodities, so that the financial market activities of private international banks 
restore the profits and the solvability of banks, much faster than by retail credit activities. As a 
consequence, these bubbles would allow governments to sell shares in private banks that they 
bought during the liquidity crisis in order to support the banks. This income coming back may 
limit partially their budget deficit and may decrease their probability of default. This may 
happen within three years time, a duration which may match electoral cycles. As a 
consequence, the support of governments for bubbles driven by international banking may 
exist, as a short term exit of sovereign default risk. The underlying idea is as follows: the 
harm of bursting bubbles can be repaired by upcoming bubbles. 
As well, the opportunities of opacity to support soft budget constraints in a period of crisis are 
most useful. Imagine a bank in Ireland declaring bankruptcy at the same time when the risk 
premium on the sovereign debt is high because of IMF negotiations. The ability to delay by a 
few months the news of the losses of the private banks by hiding them in offshore financial 
centres allows to avoid a liquidity crisis of the government. 
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Another benefit of opacity during crisis management is to smooth the social acceptance of 
buying assets with negative returns with probability one. The trouble with financial crises is 
that they reveal that some assets exhibit negative returns with probability one, that nobody 
wants to buy. Opacity allows spreading those losses in larger portfolios to be sold to 
investors, for example, after an electronic trip to offshore financial centres. In other words, an 
opaque securitization of losses allows to smooth conflicts during the management of crisis, 
using the benefits of a veil of ignorance.  
Note however, that the default on their sovereign debt of several very large countries of the 
G7 would leave the door open to unintended consequences. In particular, the default of a large 
country in the Euro area may imply first the de facto nationalization of several large European 
banks, as governments would rescue them and get the majority of shares, and second, the 
immediate control of capital flows for the defaulting country, if it gets out of the Euro area. Its 
devaluated new currency would immediately lead to an increase of the burden of borrowing 
repayments in Euro (as an “original sin”), a systemic risk on national banks along with a 
temporary sudden stop on credit, a temporary large drop of GDP and social unrest. However, 
it is likely that this self-defeating disastrous scenario for capitalism would be avoided at all 
costs.   
Because a great reversal in the regulation of international finance is not likely to happen, one 
business cycle every three decades is likely to be driven by a worldwide financial crisis. As a 
consequence, the dominant theories of business cycles need to be revised since they are not 
capable to dealing with worldwide financial crises. The overall costs of business cycles 
predicted by these models have also to be revised: the costs of depressions are much larger 
than the ones of recessions. The key assumptions of these models have to be changed. 
  
2. The failure of the financial accelerator dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models.  
 
2.1. The hypothesis of the financial accelerator DSGE. 
 
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (abbreviated DSGE) methodology attempts to 
explain aggregate business cycles, describing GDP, consumption, investment, prices, wages, 
employment, and interest rates, and mostly the effects of monetary policy (and to a little 
extent, the effect of fiscal policy), on the basis of macroeconomic models derived from 
intertemporal utility maximization (see Carré (2011) for a critical survey). 
 
New Keynesian DSGE models assume that prices are set by monopolistically competitive 
firms, and cannot be instantaneously and costlessly adjusted. Money plays a role in the short 
run. Central Banks’ behaviour follows for example a Taylor rule (Smets and Wouters (2003)). 
The DGSE methodology includes extensions with the “financial accelerator” effect, which 
take into account financial constraints. In this setting, there is heterogeneity of households. 
Some are lenders, some are borrowers. Four key assumptions are currently made that lead to 
models with similar results (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999), Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Iacoviello (2005), Del Negro, Eggertson, Ferrero, 
Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)). 
 
1. In the first key assumption – credit rationing with a collateral constraint – debt B is 
limited by the value of a collateral K owned by borrowers. The value of the collateral 
is given by its expected price q of the next period and a cyclical maximal loan-to-value 
ratio m, strictly below one, that may depend on several characteristics Z.  
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(1) ( ) ( ) tt Kq ⋅⋅⋅ +1tttt EZm< B)r+(1  
The characteristics Z are a number of factors that are – up to now – not fully specified. For 
example, these variables may be related to the inter-bank liquidity market, to the liquidity 
provided by central banks, to imperfect competition in the banking sector, to the heterogeneity 
of borrowers’ proportion of liquid collateral in their balance sheet, to the heterogeneity of the 
expectations of lenders…  
The key issues for the expected price of the collateral are the time horizon and its valuation at 
the long term fundamental value. If the expected price is not equal to the long-term 
fundamental value, the expectation of the asset price next year may differ a lot from the 
average value of the collateral for the next ten years. However, most of the literature assumes 
that the valuation of assets follows its long term fundamental value.  
The ratio of current debt to the current value of the collateral is limited by the ratio of the 
growth factor of capital gains to the interest rate factor. This gap between the return on assets 
and the return on lending is a negative function of the dividends on assets owned by lenders 
according to the arbitrage equation for lenders presented later on (equation 5).  
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2. An alternative assumption states that the interest rate on credit includes a default 
premium that depends on the probability of default, which increases with the 
debt/asset ratio. The probability of default matters because there are deadweight costs 
in case of bankruptcy.  
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The higher the current leverage, the larger is the risk premium. The higher the expected 
growth of asset prices, the lower is the risk premium. 
 
3. Once these two equations are used, wealth accumulation, also labelled “flow of funds” 
accounting equality, creates a specific dynamical relation for the financial structure 
(debt/assets). Typically, the models assume that new shares issues are too expensive, 
so that internal savings (net of consumed dividends) and new debt finances some 
financially constrained firms or households: 
 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1111 1KF −−−− +−+−=− tttttttt BrBBKKq  
 
In overlapping generation models, researchers often assume that capital fully depreciates 
during each period, so that the flow of funds equation relates the stock of capital to savings 
(Matsuyama (2007)).   
 
4. A final key relation is an arbitrage condition for lenders, who may own some assets 
and have to decide whether to lend at a given return or to invest in their own firm, with 
marginal return G’(K) along with capital gains or capital losses on asset prices (for 
example, in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Miller and Stiglitz (2010)).   
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When the expected capital gains or losses are exactly equal to zero, the arbitrage equation 
leads to the perpetual rent equation fort the “steady state” price of the asset: 
 
(6) ( )
t
lenderst
t
r
q ,
KG'
=  
But the dynamical equation is diverging from this steady state price, as soon as the capital 
gains are not equal to zero at a given date: 
 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( )lenderstttt qrq ,1t KG'1E ++=+  
 
This is an unstable dynamical equation for asset prices leading to bubbles, as soon as the price 
is not exactly equal to its long term value (the net present value of all future marginal returns 
discounted by the opportunity cost which is the return on lending). This equation is the one 
which is at the origin of the infinite number of unstable paths, except only one which is stable 
for linearized systems. This is the equation that needs to be tamed by assuming that only the 
stable path is chosen by the economic agents. In this case, the efficient market hypothesis is 
valid: the asset price does not differ from its fundamental value at any period of time for 
which lasts the simulation of the model.  
 
The DSGE models with financial accelerator assumed imperfect capital markets, with either 
the assumption of credit rationing or of bankruptcy costs (also labelled agency costs), but they 
assumed the efficient market hypothesis for the valuation of asset prices, which valued the 
collateral in the financial constraints.  
 
The financial accelerator results were consistent with a policy advice that is only recently 
challenged in central banks. Following the Internet Stock Market Bubble (2001), the 
sometimes called “Jackson Hole conference” consensus was that central banks should not try 
to stop asset price bubbles before they burst. They have to be accommodated ex post; the repo 
interest rate should be decreased after the bubble burst. Taylor rules with asset prices have a 
negligible effect in DSGE including the financial accelerator. Researchers of the Bank of 
International Settlements, such a Borio and Lowe (2000), however, consistently presented 
opposite views. What is more, these DSGE models augmented by the financial accelerator 
present a list of failures when applied to the current crisis. 
 
2.2. The failures of the financial accelerator DSGE. 
We will now analyse these failures to describe the current crisis, following DSGE modellers 
evaluating the usefulness of their model by judging how well model generated data match the 
data for an actual economy, following Friedman’s (1953) criterion for assessing models: what 
matters is the accuracy of their predictions. A typical approach is to compare actual and 
model generated relative variances of macroeconomic variables, their simple correlations and 
auto-correlations (Stadler (1994)):  
 
1. The welfare cost of the crisis, related to the large GDP fall in the U.S., was much 
larger in the current crisis than expected from the model. In a DSGE, the size of the 
initial shock is exogenous. Assume that an initial large shock occurred; then the 
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problem is that the subsequent recovery should have been much faster according to the 
model. A large shock on output should be followed in the next period by a (less) large 
rise of GDP, and then by a smoothed convergence of output returning back to its trend. 
For example, there should have been a 30% to 50% recovery of output in the first year 
following the trough of the crisis. The current crisis led to a more persistent loss of 
output than expected from the model.  
 
2. In the U.S. case, after four years following the crisis, it turned out that the persistence 
of the negative shock on employment is much larger than the persistence on output. 
This decoupling casts doubt on a linear relationship between output and employment 
assumed in some of these models. Then, “unemployment” is not an exact substitute of 
“output gap” and hysteresis matters even in the U.S. where the commonly held view is 
that the labour market is flexible.  
 
3. Because the shock was initially related to a negative shock on housing prices, the 
persistence of the recession implies that the effect of a fall of asset prices on the 
subsequent level of output was understated. This means that the long run covariance 
between housing price and output has been underestimated or that a break on their 
covariance has been missed. 
 
4. The variation of the asset prices with respect to the variation of output is much larger 
than predicted by the model. As well, the variation (or the volatility) of asset prices 
with respect to the consumer price index is understated. Even though output fell 
widely during the depression, the variation of asset prices fell even more. In technical 
terms, the slope of the unique stable path relating the variation of asset prices as a 
function of the variation of output is too small. This means that the ratio of both 
variances does not match observed data.  
 
5. Because of point (3), the proportion of the variance of the asset price which is not 
brought by the variance of output and the variance of the consumer price index is 
relatively small. This means that the coefficient of determination of a regression with 
the asset prices predicted by the model as a function of output and of the consumer 
price index is large. Technically, this comes from the linearization of the relations 
between these variables around a locally unique saddle point. Only points on the 
unique stable path are then regarded as relevant. As a consequence, the models predict 
that there will be only negligible changes of welfare when the Taylor rule takes into 
account asset prices in addition to the output gap and to the consumer price index. 
Hence, central banks should not take into account asset prices when deciding their 
money market rate (see Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) for a survey). This view is now 
revised, with a concern for macro-prudential policies since the predicted asset prices 
do not fit observed asset prices.  
 
6. The central bank is relatively efficient for accommodating the negative shock 
according to the model with a Taylor rule which does not take into account assets 
prices, even in simulations including a liquidity trap. During the crisis, monetary 
policy turned out to be less efficient than expected. The ability of a monetary policy, in 
particular of a quantitative easing policy, to escape the crisis has been overstated. In 
Del Negro et al. (2010), the duration of quantitative easing policy, where central banks 
buy assets, was supposed to last less than 10 quarters following the start of the crisis in 
2007. Their “Great Escape” title should have been replaced by the over-optimistic 
“Big Easy” (Escape) title. In January 2012, Alan Blinder argued that the 
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circumstances (low inflation and low nominal interest rate, persistent excess capacity 
and fiscal policy paralysed by large debts), that have forced central banks to operate 
through unconventional policy will be a recurring feature of the economic landscape. 
 
7. The ability of the fiscal policy to accommodate the crisis is understated due to an 
emphasis of the Ricardian effect, even with a zero lower bound in interest rate.  
 
8. The variation of the asset prices with respect to the variation of output was more rapid 
during the crisis than during the boom. This asymmetry of the volatility of asset prices 
for a negative shock with respect to a positive shock is not taken into account in the 
linearised DSGE. 
 
 
2.3. The financial accelerator DSGE model and the persistence of large negative shocks. 
 
The Real Business Cycles approach, followed by the DSGE modelling emphasized that their 
impulse propagation approach was able to replicate macroeconomic time series, in particular 
their persistence properties, while using impulses related to productivity shocks or demand 
shocks which are persistent, according to an auto-regressive process (sometimes, the random 
term is the log of an random term):  
 
( ) ( ) ttt u+⋅= −1loglog ερε   with ( )u2σ  given. 
 
In order to describe the current crisis, it is possible to increase the size of the initial shock 
(that is increasing the variance of the shock u), and also to increase the autocorrelation 
parameter denoted ρ . 
 
But the trouble with this approach is that it implies an unexplained, non structural and ad hoc 
break on the parameterization of the impulses with respect to previous studies describing the 
post-war business cycles before 2007, in particular in the United States. This is an 
inconsistency leading to a disguised defeat of the structural ambition of the DSGE research 
program. 
 
With respect to the propagation equations of DSGE models, other unexplained, non structural 
and ad hoc breaks with respect to pre-2007 studies have been introduced in order to increase 
the persistence of negative shocks in the simulations. They are related to the technology 
introducing more lags and longer time to build and/or to the utility function with a larger habit 
persistence parameter. These changes of parameters may fit the ongoing crisis but not the 
previous post war business cycles. 
 
In the impulse and propagation theories of the business cycle, one can set the cursor between 
a pure « random impulse » model of a cycle (for example, an auto-regressive model of output) 
and a pure deterministic causal chains endogenous cycle. Causal factors omitted in the 
propagation mechanism are then reverted in the « variations of the random impulse », leading 
to an omitted variables bias. For example, these ad hoc breaks in the persistence are added in 
the financial accelerator DSGE models of the crisis at the same time than introducing 
additional financial features in the model. But it is not clear whether the increase of 
persistence in the simulation is really due to the modeling of the banking sector or on, say, the 
ad hoc increase of the habit persistence parameter in the representative household utility 
function.  
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By contrast, it may be that causal chains are missing in those models which may explain the 
break leading to an increase on the persistence of the shock for the ongoing crisis. Those 
causal factors may be related to unreliable asset pricing, to the inefficient design of incentive 
compatibility contracts leading to the distribution of ex post losses which were not ex ante 
taken into account, to the government deficits following bailing out the banks, to the 
persistent loss of trust between private banks on the inter-bank money market leading to 
persistent quantitative easing by the central banks and so on. Those factors are omitted and 
fall into the increase of the auto-correlation coefficient of the random impulse or the “habit 
persistence” parameter. 
 
In fact, the problem is not new: the business cycle models without the financial accelerator 
found a loss of utility for the representative agent which is very small for post-war business 
cycles in the United States:  
 
“It indicates that economic instability at the level we have experience since the Second World 
War is a minor problem, even relative to historically experiences inflation and certainly 
relative to the cost of modestly reduced rates of economic growth.” Lucas (1987, p.30)  
 
A key determinant of the cost of the business cycles is the unconstrained Euler equation for 
households, the growth of consumption is determined only as an increasing function of the 
rate of interest on savings and decreasing with the aversion to consumption volatility,  
 
σ
ρ−
=
trCg )( . 
 
This equation is rarely challenged in macroeconomic textbooks. However, it does not match 
the data (Caroll (1997). It leads to too small costs of cycles for the representative agent. The 
social cost of consumption volatility is far too small (Lucas (1987), and Gollier (2001, p.224).  
 
This equation assumes very specific resource constraints, which are not valid with credit 
rationing, or lack of demand on a market during a liquidity crisis. A structural research 
programme allows other possibilities for defining resource constraints for households. Using 
the unconstrained Euler equation for describing households behaviour may lead to low values 
when measuring the welfare costs of recessions.  
 
However, even when the Lagrange multipliers related to the financial constraints are taken 
into account so that the Euler equation changes in the financial accelerator models, the social 
cost does not increase a lot. So the financial accelerator model may lead to a “business cycle 
redux”, as analysed by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004): 
 
“Theoretical studies have shown that under unorthodox assumptions on preference and 
production technologies, collateral constraints can act as a powerful amplification and 
propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks. We investigate whether or not this result holds 
under more standard assumptions. We find that collateral constraints generate a typically 
small output amplification. Large amplification is a “knife-edge” type of result.” 
 
The clear-cut distinction between growth and business cycles theories which does exist in 
macroeconomic textbooks faces then an empirical problem with recessions and world 
financial crises. The possibility to disentangle the growth component from the cyclical 
component in macroeconomic time series changes with respect to more regular periods. Large 
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crises last long and affect the growth trend, not only the cyclical component: USA 1929-1946, 
Japan 1990’s-2010. This led us again to the question on the modelling on the break on the 
persistence of negative shocks. 
 
The DGSE models with the financial accelerator model take into account bankruptcy costs. 
However, liquidity problems and systemic stability of the financial systems (systemic 
bankruptcy due to the loss of confidence of banks and/or investors) was set outside of the 
model. A second persistent (“stable”) equilibrium was set aside of those models, which 
considered only a unique equilibrium. This existence of a second persistent equilibrium is 
another asymmetric property of the economy during crisis, with respect to the boom period.   
 
 
 
3. Changing two key complementary assumptions 
 
3.1. The structural research programme compatible with the Lucas Critique 
 
Although the financial accelerator DGSE models assumed imperfect capital markets, they 
were not able to describe the mechanism of the 2007-2010 crisis. We argue that, besides the 
imperfect capital markets assumption of the previous section, five additional assumptions, 
alternative to the usual settings, are required, to make progress in explaining macroeconomics 
exhibiting financial crises. Because the “Lucas critique” is the usual argument against changes 
in fundamental hypotheses used in macroeconomic modelling, we will detail for each of these 
hypothesis whether they contradict the structural modelling research programme which 
intends to take into account the Lucas critique. 
 
The defence of the mainstream dynamic stochastic general equilibrium remains based on 
recurrent references to the Lucas critique (1976): “Given that the structure of an econometric 
model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules 
vary systematically with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it 
follows that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric 
models”. 
 
Because the parameters of large scale macro-econometric models at the time were not 
structural, i.e. not policy-invariant, they would necessarily change whenever economic policy 
(the rules of the game) changed. Economic agents do and should take changes in economic 
policy into account when deciding on their actions. Policy conclusions based on these models 
would therefore be potentially misleading. In other words, the expectations, the behaviour of 
individual agents and the behaviour of the government were not correctly specified in the 
macro-econometric models of the seventies. 
 
The “structural research programme” followed the Lucas critique. It suggests that if we want 
to predict the effect of a policy experiment, we should model the “deep parameters” (related 
to preferences, technology, and resource constraints) that govern individual behaviour as well 
as government policy behaviour. Only changes in economic fundamentals can have long run 
effects on the time path of the economy. We can then predict what individuals will do, taking 
into account the change in policy.  
 
We propose two complementary assumptions to improve financial macroeconomic models 
that are not inconsistent with the “structural research programme” that followed the Lucas 
critique.  
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3.2. Hypothesis I: a stable equilibrium with a “liquidity uncertainty trap” is possible. 
 
3.2.1. Irving Fisher’s capsizing regime versus stability corridor regime. 
 
We argue first that the financial accelerator is a misreading summary of Irving Fisher’s ideas. 
Ben Bernanke is one of the most qualified economist scholars due to his long-term interest for 
the crisis of the thirties and his revival of Irving Fisher’s debt deflation ideas during the last 
thirty years. However, Ben Bernanke proposed the misleading statement that central banks 
should intervene after the burst of an asset price bubble (Bernanke and Gertler (2000)), 
without ex ante control of such a bubble.  
“We explore the implications of asset price volatility for the management of monetary policy. 
We show that it is desirable for central banks to focus on underlying inflationary pressures. 
Asset prices become relevant only to the extent they may signal potential inflationary or 
deflationary forces. Rules that directly target asset prices appear to have undesirable side 
effects. We base our conclusions on (i) simulation of different policy rules in a small scale 
macro model and (ii) a comparative analysis of recent U.S. and Japanese monetary policy”  
(Bernanke Gertler, NBER WP, 2000, (abstract, p. 2)).  
A central claim for this error is a common misunderstanding of the ideas of Irving Fisher 
(1933), that financial crises are only related to a financial accelerator amplifying technological 
and productivity shocks leading to over-investment, such as the new car industry in the 
1920’s, the internet industry in the 1990’s and so on. For Haberler (1941)  
“But clearly, over-investment rather than over-indebtedness is the primary cause of the 
breakdown… We may thus conclude that the “debt-factor” plays an independent role as 
intensifier of the depression, but can hardly be regarded as an independent cause of the 
breakdown.” (Chapter 4, 1941 edition, p.115-116).  
However, Irving Fisher refers regularly in his 1933 paper to a boat metaphor:  
“To take another simile, such a disaster is somewhat like the “capsizing” of a ship which, 
under ordinary conditions, is always near stable equilibrium, but which, after being tipped 
beyond a certain angle, has no longer this tendency to return to equilibrium, but, instead, a 
tendency to depart from it. But if the over-indebtedness is not sufficiently great to make 
liquidation thus defeat itself, it is then more analogous to stable equilibrium; the more the 
boat rocks, the more it will tend to right himself.” 
For small wave shocks on its large side, the boat oscillates around its equilibrium, inside a 
“stability corridor”. By analogy, this describes, regular economic cycles, not a large crisis. 
But, for large waves on its large side, the boat passes below a threshold angle, and falls into 
the water. This corresponds to a low level equilibrium related to “economic instability”. 
Hence, the story of Irving Fisher is not only a story of amplified oscillation around a single 
equilibrium (in a corridor of stability), it is also a story of bifurcation towards a second low 
stable equilibrium (“persistent instability”), with an overall risk of macroeconomic 
bankruptcy, along with a breakdown of the financial system and low production level with 
self-finance autarky. This second “liquidity uncertainty trap” equilibrium may also be related 
to a bank run low equilibrium as dealt with by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or Bryant (1981) 
in the field of microeconomics of banking. The economy may only be able to pass the 
downward threshold (the threshold angle for the boat) leading to the second bad equilibrium 
due to the over-lending amplification of over-investment. Else, over-investment theories alone 
may lead only to minor shocks and the economy remains only in the stability corridor. As a 
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consequence, because without the financial accelerator, the shift to the low equilibrium 
(“instability”) is unlikely to occur, over-lending is then a cause of the breakdown. 
A dynamical model representing a possible relationship between the asset price at the current 
date q(t) and the asset price at the next date q(t+1) is shown in figure 1. Starting from the 
equilibrium E1, if a small negative shock on the asset price q(t) occurs, such that q(t) is equal 
to B, the economy exhibits small fluctuations around the stable equilibrium E1. These 
fluctuations occur in a corridor of stability.  
But if a large negative shock occurs, such that the asset price q(t) is below the value of a 
second unstable equilibrium E2, then the asset price dynamics follows a different decreasing 
and diverging path towards a third equilibrium, which is also stable, the equilibrium where the 
asset price is equal to zero and no one buys the asset (liquidity crisis). Because this third 
equilibrium is stable, the model is able to explain the persistence of large negative shocks.   
 
 
Figure 1. Small cycle in a stability corridor and large shock crisis. 
 
Until recently, modern mainstream macro-economics dealing with the financial accelerator 
very rarely considered this second “stable” equilibrium related to instability to be important. 
Minsky’s (1982) question “Can it happen again?” referring to the 1929 crisis was answered 
as “never”. The argument was based on an under-valuation of the probability of a world 
financial crisis: the probability was assumed to be close to zero. It was also based on an 
under-valuation of the ex post cost of a world financial crisis. For example, the evaluation of 
the cost of the financial crisis in the 1990s in developed countries such as Sweden were 2 to 5 
times smaller than the cost incurred by emerging economies such as Argentina. This was also 
backed by Lucas (1987) small valuation of business cycles loss of welfare for a representative 
agent with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  
Since the start of the crisis, central bankers changed their views and considered the possibility 
of macro-prudential regulation policies. The problem highlighted is not that bankruptcy costs 
were missing in the financial accelerator. What is missing is the possibility of systemic 
bankruptcy due to expectations of a high probability of default due to a lack of confidence. 
The Lucas critique does not exclude that there are multiple equilibria in the economy. Driskill 
(2005) even states that “multiple equilibria are a ubiquitous feature of dynamic rational 
expectations models”. Driskill (2005) reviews many papers which assume four criteria leading 
to a coordination of beliefs selecting a unique equilibrium. Real business cycle models in the 
spirit of the structural research programme assume that without exogenous shocks the 
economy would remain on its unique long-run equilibrium path. Even with exogenous shocks, 
prices are assumed to change infinitely rapidly so as to clear all markets instantaneously. By 
contrast, the structural modelling research programme emphasizes only the neat modelling of 
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expectations. It is inconsistent to claim that the possibility of a liquidity crisis equilibrium, 
which is ontologically driven by expectations as in Bryant’s (1983) model, contradicts the 
“structural research programme” following the Lucas critique. 
 
3.2.2. Qualitative differences between the “liquidity uncertainty trap” and the “stability 
corridor” for policy makers.   
The issue at stake is not only to have a particular modelling of the persistence of large 
negative shocks. A DSGE model far from its unique equilibrium but with shocks with large 
persistence, such as Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) may provide the same predictions than a 
model with two stable regimes and a probability of transition from one regime to the other. 
What is more, the model with multiple equilibria may be more unstable to fit and may have 
larger prediction errors, in particular because of the non linear modelling of the probability of 
transition. These issues are faced by the behavioural multiple regime macroeconomic model 
built by De Grauwe (2010).  
But “to predict is not to explain”. Shmueli (2010) describes the usual distinction between 
prediction and explanation in applied statistics as follows. The “prediction” objective targets 
to minimize the “root mean square error” of the difference between the observed outcome 
variable and the predicted outcome from the association (not necessarily causal) with other 
variables, often with a focus on out of sample predictions. The “explanation” objective targets 
to minimize the bias of the coefficients between an explained outcome variable and 
explanatory variables, in order to test causal hypothesis about theoretical constructs, often 
with a focus on the in sample explanation of past events. Because the targets differ, there is 
not a perfect overlap: a good model for “forecasting” may not be a good model for 
“explanation”. Note that this issue is distinct from parsimony. A parsimonious model may be 
better to predict or may be better to explain depending on omitted variable bias, on over-
fitting or on near-multicolinearity issues (Chatelain and Ralf (2012)). 
However, multiple equilibria models differ from single equilibrium models because they are 
related to explanations based on qualitative discontinuity. This is a distinct argument that 
Shmueli to state that “to predict is not to explain”, which has been put forward by Thom’s 
(1993) catastrophe theory. We highlight this qualitative discontinuity from the point of view 
of policy makers. Policy makers may face distinct policy objectives in these regimes, along 
with a credibility dilemma for inflation targeting versus financial stability objectives, which 
reverses policy priorities: 
In the stability corridor regime, targeting inflation at 2% and output growth at 2% are efficient 
policies, and the economy faces mild distributional issues. For inflation targeting, the 
credibility of limited money creation and of the independence from government is regarded to 
be efficient. 
In the liquidity trap regime, policy makers intend to avoid deflation and the zero bound on 
nominal interest rate. They may have to act as “spenders of last resort”. Although the liquidity 
trap and the liquidity uncertainty trap occur simultaneously most of the time, there may be 
some cases of liquidity uncertainty trap without deflation. 
In the liquidity uncertainty trap (or “capsizing” regime), policy makers have to restore 
financial stability, trust and liquidity on the interbank market and/or the deposits market 
and/or the sovereign debt market. They may have to act as “lenders of last resort”. They may 
use persistent “unconventional” quantitative easing policy as well as “conventional” 
budgetary policy. In order to restore confidence and financial stability, a strong credibility for 
unlimited money creation for refinancing banks, for example, for the next three years, is 
required. The same may apply as well for buying government bonds in order to sustain 
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government budget in the context of the risk of bailing out the banking system by the 
government. This credibility goes along with no independence of the central bank from the 
government. What is more, in this regime, policy makers have to handle huge distributional 
conflicts related to the distribution of unplanned losses. How to share the losses between 
groups (borrowers versus lenders, investors versus wage earners, banks or government, the 
rich or the poor, the current or the next generations, foreign countries or IMF, and so on) is 
the main source of uncertainty. 
In the liquidity uncertainty trap regime, bank runs and banking crises are followed by 
government bailing out banks, or insuring deposits, with a risk of a public debt crisis, which 
may be sometimes followed by a rise of inflation to decrease public debt. As taxes are needed 
as well to bail out the banks, savers and pensioners and/or wage earners pay, along with a 
transfer from an old generation (facing the crisis) to a young generation which may not face a 
crisis next period (Amable, Chatelain, De Bandt (2002)). A banking crisis may also last a long 
time, with continued “Zombie” lending to bankrupt banks and firms as in Japan (Caballero, 
Hoshi, Kashyap (2006)). All these events lead to large swings in income distribution due to 
transfers between lenders, borrowers, bankers, governments, savers, and wage earners.  
 
3.2.3. Radical uncertainty versus misleading incentive compatibility constraint. 
 
There have been some arguments that radical uncertainty was missing in the modelling of 
business cycles. Radical uncertainty refers to a first time or unique event for which a 
probability distribution cannot be computed. However, financial crises are no longer first time 
events. The uncertainty is mostly related to the distribution of losses. When a depositor runs 
to a bank, he hopes to arrive earlier than another one, in order to shift the distribution of the 
losses of the banks to latecomers. It is not impossible to set a subjective probability 
distribution for who is going to pay for the losses. As long as the negotiation process for 
sharing the losses does not end, this additional uncertainty surrounds the crises. Large 
uncertainty is not necessarily radical uncertainty. 
 
More important than the omission of radical uncertainty is the omission of default and fraud. 
In the theoretical modelling of financial constraints and financial structure, default is only 
taken into account ex ante with incentive compatibility constraints such than the return when 
an economic agent cheats is equal to the return when this economic agent does not cheat. This 
limits the size of credit, so that internal funding is proportionally sufficiently large. In this 
case, diverting funds of the company amounts to divert a sufficiently large proportion of the 
agents own funds, so that the agent does not benefit from diverting funds.  
However, this modelling has the drawback that agents never fraud in the model. It first 
suggests that the ex ante rational regulation of international capital markets is always able to 
eradicate fraud completely. Second, there is no ex post default due to fraud, and the ex ante 
design of the financial contract already planned the distribution of losses, so that the 
distributional uncertainty mentioned above is ruled out. 
 
An alternative model is the tax evasion model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Agents still 
fraud and face a probability of being discovered and paying a fine. Note that, in this case, the 
probability of being discovered for international financial fraud is very low due to the 
competition for opacity between jurisdictions, except from very large fraud following extreme 
events. 
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3.3. Hypothesis II: reject the efficient market hypothesis that the price of an asset always 
reflects its fundamental value. 
 
3.3.1. “Inefficient” asset pricing is compatible with the Lucas Critique. 
 
The problem of the financial accelerator DGSE was that the expected price of collateral is 
assumed to be always equal to its fundamental value (no over-valuation or under-valuation). 
In real economies, the under-valuation is fostered by fire sales, and a liquidity crisis leads to 
too few exchanges on the financial markets, which explains the asymmetry between under-
valuation brisk fall during a crisis and longer periods building up the over-valuation of assets 
during booms. With weakly regulated international banks, opacity implies that asset prices are 
never equal to their fundamental value or that the fundamental value cannot even be correctly 
defined. 
 
A key consequence is that one exit option from a banking crisis is to start a new bubble 
elsewhere. Describing this phenomenon is currently forbidden in the mainstream 
macroeconomic modelling. It seems that international capital surfed from the Asian Bubble to 
the Internet Bubble to the Housing Bubble to the next bubble: Chinese bank lending, China’s 
or India’s stock market, commodities markets. But, who knows, e.g. in the case of China, 
whether asset prices are correctly valued, and whether Chinese statistics are reliable? 
 
It seems that rejecting the assumption that the price is equal to its fundamental value is 
difficult for many macroeconomists, whereas in the field of microeconomics of banking, 
economists such as Schleifer and Vishny (2010) do not have difficulties to reject it when 
describing unstable banking. The assumption itself is only a narrow interpretation of the 
efficient market hypothesis as it is seen by financial economists. Malkiel (2003) uses as a 
“definition of efficient financial markets that such markets do not allow investors to earn 
above-average returns without accepting above-average risks”, p.60. Then markets can be 
efficient, even if many market participants are irrational and stock prices show larger 
volatility than can be explained by fundamentals. On the other hand, behavioural finance 
added some insight in the explanation of excess volatility of asset prices. “Evidence from 
behavioural finance helps us to understand, for example, that the recent worldwide stock 
market boom, and then crash after 2000, had its origins in human foibles and arbitrary 
feedback relations and must have generated a real and substantial misallocation of resources.” 
(Shiller 2003, p.102) 
 
Rejecting the narrow interpretation of the efficient financial market hypothesis is not 
incompatible with the structural research programme. If two groups of agents face different 
information on the expected value of an asset on the same date: some are correctly informed, 
some are not.1 The research programme would require a neat modelling of different resource 
constraints (information), preferences and technology for rational investors. It could even be 
rational for naïve investors to follow the herd when the cost of acquiring the true information 
is too large. Then, there may be the possibility that the price of an asset differs systematically 
from the fundamental value of this asset.    
 
The issue of inefficient asset pricing is also related to the issue of multiple equilibria with 
rational expectations. According to Driskill (2005 p.176), multiple equilibria are endemic 
because of the conjunction of the rational expectations assumption with an infinite time 
                                                 
1
 Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) derive speculative bubbles in an equilibrium model where small differences in 
the beliefs of agents lead to trade. These bubbles are accompanied by large trading volume and high price 
volatility.  
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horizon: “In an infinite-horizon model, this means that there is always one more price to be 
determined – the next-period price – than there are equilibrium conditions. That is, for any 
arbitrary number of periods n, there are n equations – the equilibrium conditions that 
demand equals supply – but n+1 endogenous variables – the n prices plus the (n+1)th 
expected price”. Then, infinite horizon auxiliary assumptions are quite often used as an 
equilibrium selection device coordinating beliefs, which is presented in the next subsection.  
 
3.3.2. Reject the No Ponzi Game and the Transversality Conditions. 
 
The transversality condition on the growth of accumulated capital (in endogenous growth) 
or the growth of population (in exogenous growth) states that these growth rates have to be 
lower than real interest rate used as a discount rate in the infinite horizon optimization 
models: 
r<gK  
 
By analogy to a finite horizon terminal condition, it states that the discounted value of 
capital in the infinite horizon is zero. The transversality condition is the choice of a terminal 
condition for infinite horizon optimization problems which is necessary only when lifetime 
utility is finite at the optimum (Kamihigashi (2004)). This property clear states that the 
transversality condition does not imply that discounted utility has always  to be bounded. On 
the contrary, Halkin (1974) famous simple counter-example demonstrates that in general, 
there are no necessary transversality conditions for infinite horizon optimal control problems, 
when one does not assume that the objective function converges. The first model of this type 
was proposed by Ramsey (1928) with an objective function without discounting and it did not 
assume those transversality conditions, and it is still not considered as flawed.  
 
The No-Ponzi Game condition (henceforth the NPG condition) on public and/or private 
debt (which also stands for a transversality condition for debt) eliminates the possibility of 
Ponzi chain letter by stating that the growth of public or private debt has to be lower than the 
real interest rate charged on this debt in the infinite horizon.  
 
trBg <)( . 
 
Firstly, three remarks regarding macroeconomic theory can be made: 
 
(1) This assumption is used to rule out the existence of bubbles prior to the infinite 
horizon in macro-economic models. This is consistent with the efficient financial 
market hypothesis eliminating the possibility of bubbles. 
 
(2) It implies bounded utility. Note that it is not a necessary assumption of infinite horizon 
optimisation. An infinite objective function is a possible solution, as in the Ramsey 
(1928) model. If one maximizes discounted utility over time, why should one refuse 
infinite utility? 
 
(3) It is a key assumption to obtain Ricardian equivalence (e.g. the inefficiency of 
budgetary policy financed by debt and followed by taxes later on) (Barro (1974)). It is 
related to an infinite horizon government solvency condition which is necessarily 
fulfilled in the real world. However, this may be different from short run solvency. 
Imagine that we apply a similar reasoning than in the financial accelerator: public debt 
is solvent based on expected taxes net of public expenditures: 
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If the expected growth of output is large and if the interest rate on public bonds is low, 
this solvency constraint is likely to be respected. This is what bond holders may think 
about in the short run. They would like taxes to increases and public expenditures to 
fall, but would enjoy more growth of output which increases the tax base.  
 
Imagine that this is the case for all future periods. Then, for all dates the public debt is 
“short term” solvent. Imagine that at the same time, the growth rate of output is equal 
to the growth rate of public debt, but is larger than the real interest rate on public debt. 
Then, the “infinite horizon” (no Ponzi game) solvency constraint is not fulfilled, 
whereas the short run solvency constraint is always fulfilled. In this case, the infinite 
horizon solvency constraint is meaningless. Utility is unbounded though. In this 
context, we do not know whether Ricardian equivalence holds or not. 
 
Secondly, those conditions are not frequently observed in real economies, whereas the 
economies described in mainstream macroeconomic theory always assume them in thousands 
of pages of textbooks and journal articles. For example, Azizi et al. (2012) found that the no 
Ponzi game condition and the transversality condition where only valid for 24% of the 
observations of OECD data during the last forty years. Twenty years ago, a similar result was 
acknowledged by Blanchard and Weil (1992): The average realized real rate of return on 
government debt for major OECD countries over the last 30 years has been smaller than the 
growth rate. Does this imply that governments can play a Ponzi debt game, rolling over their 
debt without ever increasing taxes?” 
  
Thirdly, although it is not the spirit of their use in macroeconomic theory, are those conditions 
normative, that is “good economic” policy should satisfy no Ponzi game and transversality 
conditions?  
 
For maximizing government solvency, this is not the case more than half of the times. Using  
OECD data since 1970, Azizi et al. (2012) found that, in the cases of public debt retrenchment 
(a decrease of the debt/GDP ratio improving government solvency, 45% of overall cases), 
only 42% of those cases occurred with the growth rate of debt and of GDP lower than the 10 
years government bonds yields. By contrast, 58% of debt retrenchment annual events 
occurred with the 10 years government bonds yield below the growth rate of output. 
 
For maximizing economic growth, not a single “growth miracle” would have ever been 
achieved with policy makers targeting the transversality condition! Indeed, in all the cases of 
growth miracles, the growth of output consistently exceeded the real rate of interest for 
several decades (for example, Japan 1960-1990, China 1990-2010). Then, endogenous growth 
models where the growth rate of output exceeds the real interest may be relevant (Amable, 
Chatelain, Ralf (2010)). On the other hand, very low real interest rates cannot be a cut-off for 
selecting high productivity projects. This means that other criteria than interest rate (such as 
growth driven industrial policy by MITI in Japan) were used in order to allocate capital to 
high productivity investment. Countries failing to use alternative criteria than interest rates to 
select high productivity may have faced stagnation with low interest rates.  
 
For minimizing bubbles, subsequent financial crises, the volatility of output and employment, 
the argument is that “too” low interest rate with respect to economic growth and the growth of 
debt would lead to “over-priced” assets, excess leverage and bursting bubbles. However, this 
was likely to be the case during the years of “low interest rate financial repression” around the 
world in the 1950’s and 1960’s. But, there was an adverse effect, much more capital control, 
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so that the frequency of financial and banking crises was very small. On the other hand, a 
counter example may be found with the 1987 stock market krach and the savings and loans 
debacle in the United States where the growth of output was on average below the real rate of 
interest during several years before the krach.      
  
If the non efficient financial market hypothesis is consistent with the research programme 
following the Lucas critique, then one can take final steps by rejecting the no Ponzi game and 
the transversality conditions.  
 
3.3.3. Reject the unique stable path dynamics auxiliary assumption. 
 
Intertemporal optimization with rational expectations leads nearly always to a short-term 
equilibrium that is a saddle point, i.e. it exists only one path of lower dimension which is 
stable; all the others are unstable. The assumption that all agents are able at any time to carry 
out their desired actions means that all points which are not on the stable manifold are 
regarded as irrelevant. All unstable paths are therefore ruled out by assumption. But this 
“rational expectation” hypothesis is an additional assumption with respect to the Lucas 
critique.  
 
Furthermore, the linearization around the equilibrium of the unique stable path leading to 
unique long term equilibrium reduces the study of macroeconomics dynamics to damped 
exponential responses of macroeconomic variables to small shocks. As a consequence, the 
volatility of asset prices on the saddle-path is much lower than on the others, for the same 
optimizing model. As well, the predicted covariance of asset prices with output on the unique 
stable path differs a lot with respect to what is on the unstable paths. 
  
Several points can be made here: 
First, rejecting the unique equilibrium goes along with accepting the “expectation driven” 
liquidity crisis alternative equilibrium. Multiple equilibria driven by expectations are 
consistent with the research programme.  
 
Second, the linearization considers only small shocks, which do not correspond to recessions. 
It leads to a repetitive representation of macroeconomics dynamics as damped responses of 
macroeconomic to small shocks. Along with the multiple equilibria hypothesis, large shocks 
are likely to shift the regime of the economy, and the dynamics would differ dramatically. 
 
Third, “the unique stable path” goes along with the no Ponzi game condition which rules out 
that the economy follows temporary bubble paths for asset prices prior the infinite horizon. 
That means that all agents know when asset prices are on a bubble path, and that they decide 
ex ante never to be on the unstable path.  
 
Fourth, these models are structurally unstable, since a small disturbance that moves the 
economy away from the converging path changes the behaviour of the system (Vercelli 
(1991), Ralf (2000)). This is not desired as it contradicts the paradigm of market clearing at 
any time and, therefore, all points outside the converging path are considered as economically 
irrelevant (Burmeister et al. (1973)). In practice, the macroeconomics theorist  choose a 
number of “jump” variables at least equal to the dimension of the unstable manifold, which 
jump to the stable manifold immediately after any shocks and force convergence to the unique 
long-run equilibrium. The initial condition does not determine the path chosen by the 
representative agent: it is instead the infinite horizon terminal value. More precisely, in the 
financial accelerator DSGE, the arbitrage equation for lenders (equation 4), which is the 
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origin of the instability, is valid on unstable paths where assets tend to an infinite value. 
Lenders are not “irrational”, they are doing rational arbitrage between two expected returns 
taking into the expected price of assets next period. However, they are not “infinite horizon” 
rational on those unstable paths. Their valuations of assets do not converge smoothly to the 
perpetual rent long run equilibrium value. They may not even compute the expected average 
rate of return on assets over the next ten years, but just for the next year. 
 
Fifth, ruling out over-valuation and under-valuation by the market rules out the rational next 
period/short term “market timing” behaviour, which takes advantage of these mis-valuations 
and which in turn amplifies the fluctuations of assets prices. It has been taught for nearly fifty 
years that mutual funds managers can make money, buying assets more sensitive to the 
market index when the stock market is expected to be bull (assets with beta over unity) and 
selling them when the market is expected to be bear. “Sudden stops” for emerging market 
crises is a “business cycle timing” variation on the “market timing” behaviour: when an 
economy is expected to face a recession, investors decide to sell assets of this country. It is the 
same scheme which is described by Schleifer and Vishny (2010) on rational unstable banking. 
A number of naïve investors do not know that the asset is not correctly priced. A boom with 
over-priced assets is expected to be followed by a crisis, with under-priced assets, with 
knowledgeable investors (banks) taking advantage of this price differences. Then, it is easy to 
compute the conditions for more informed rational banks to speculate.  
 
 
3.4. Two complementary assumptions: inefficient asset pricing determines the shift from 
the stability corridor to the “capsizing” regime. 
 
Inefficient asset pricing implies the possibility of larger shifts in asset pricing. On figure 1, the 
probability of transition from the stability corridor to the capsizing regime depends on the 
probability to have negative shocks on asset prices that are larger than (E2-q*). The modelling 
of asset pricing as being efficient and much closer to their fundamental value decreases the 
probability to shift to the “capsizing” regime. Because inefficient asset pricing increases the 
probability of transition from the stability corridor to the “capsizing” regime, the assumptions 
of inefficient asset pricing and multiple equilibria are complementary. 
 
When asset prices were much less volatile with less opacity on their valuation and when the 
contagion of negative shocks between national and international asset classes were limited, 
such as during the Bretton Woods period (1945 to 1973), the economy was able to remain in 
the stability corridor. As such, Lucas business cycle theory was compatible with highly 
regulated international finance. It corresponds to the U.S. business cycles features when Lucas 
got his Ph.D. 
 
By contrast, there were again frequent banking and financial crisis in several countries after 
1973. To find assets valued at their long term average value, in particular in the balance sheet 
of international banks, is particularly difficult. This increased uncertainty on the valuation of 
assets leads to a higher probability to shift to the “capsizing” regime. It was not so relevant for 
the Bretton Woods period. This behaviour of economies is related to the period where 
Krugman got his Ph.D.  
 
3.5. The Ongoing Macroeconomics Crisis Literature 
 
It is too early as well as very difficult to have a judgment on the ongoing macroeconomic 
literature dealing with the current crisis. It is on the making, based on working papers the 
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content of which change every three month, with few papers already published in academic 
journals. The aim is to introduce banks’ leverage, interbank liquidity, large shocks, fire sales 
and systemic crises into macroeconomics. Our first and superficial impressions from a limited 
sample are the following: 
 
(1) Although DSGE bashing becomes very fashionable since the beginning of the crisis, 
there is a slight inconsistency in these revolutionary declarations and the recent output 
supposed to renew macroeconomics. Most of the papers keep the DSGE framework. 
For example, some papers mostly assume a larger size of initial shocks than 
previously done in order to mimic the larger swing of the crisis in their simulations. 
 
(2) Many papers remain very orthodox with respect to the valuation of assets based on 
their fundamental value (efficient asset markets hypothesis). 
 
(3) Perhaps, because they are on the making, these models are often not elegant nor 
parsimonious, packed with a large number of heavy equations as intending to model 
very much in detail for example the inter-bank market, as well as banks and non 
financial firms wealth accumulation, along with habit persistence.  
 
(4) By contrast, there is clearly a need to offer an undergraduate level model, to be 
relevant to explain the crisis. A good starting point may be the Krugman (2002) 
“fourth generation” crisis paper, which relates asset prices to output with simple 
equations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Krugman’s fourth generation crisis. 
 
To draw a parallel in the history of science, some of those models look like Middle Ages 
extensions of the Ptolemaic models of the law of motions of planets. In order to explain the 
cyclical retrograde movement of Mars in the sky, planets were assumed to move in a small 
circle called an epicycle, which in turn moves along a larger circle. According to Hald (2003), 
“Small systematic discrepancies between observed and predicted values (of Ptolemy’s model) 
were noted. Arab and European astronomers in the Middle Ages thus improved upon 
Ptolemy’s model by adding epicycles to epicycles, eccentrics to eccentrics, eccentrics with 
moving centers, and so on.” For Duhem (1906), the objective was to “save the phenomena” 
for a better prediction, not for a better explanation. Adding epicycles amounts to approximate 
any cyclical movements due to the convergence of a finite sum of complex Fourier series 
(Hanson (1960)). By contrast, the Kepler model changed two complementary core 
assumptions for a better explanation, later refined by Newton’s law of gravity: the earth and 
the other planets revolved around the sun and the orbit of a planet is an ellipse (with the sun in 
one focus) instead of a circle. The Kepler model turned to be less complex than Ptolemy’s 
model and with a much better fit. It used fewer parameters and restrictions along with a large 
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decrease of the maximal error with respect to the Ptolemy’s model. Spanos (2007) checked 
also the white noise nature of its residuals which is not the case of the Ptolemaic model. The 
two new core assumptions were complementary to reduce complexity. Copernicus’ model, 
which changed only the first one and kept the assumption of the orbit of a planet as a circle, 
was as complex as Ptolemy’s model along with the same maximum error for the motion of 
Mars (Hald (2003) p.166). Note that the parallel for changing core assumptions is also related 
to, at the time, religious and, nowadays, ideological beliefs defended by scholars from 
powerful institutions. 
 
A research programme for the financial macroeconomics theory of depressions would have to 
take into account these two complementary assumptions: (1) the “capsizing” or “liquidity 
uncertainty trap” second equilibrium and (2) that the short run pricing of assets may differ 
from their long run “efficient market hypothesis” value. Both assumptions are compatible 
with multiple equilibria arising with rational expectations (Driskill (2005)). Unfortunately, it 
is not granted that model complexity would disappear, at least in the medium run. It took 
centuries for astronomers and decades for Kepler to find out a less complex model. 
 
“All models are wrong but some are useful” (Box (1976): We need criteria to decide what is 
an “useful model” for choosing among alternative hypothesis equally consistent with the 
available evidence. According to Friedman (1953, p.10) “there is general agreement that 
relevant considerations are suggested by the criteria “simplicity” and “fruitfulness”... A 
theory is “simpler” the less the initial knowledge needed to make a prediction within a given 
field of phenomena; it is more “fruitful”, the more precise the resulting prediction, the wider 
the area within which the theory yield prediction, and the more additional lines for further 
research it suggests”. We observed that the current assumptions in recent research modelling 
financial depressions in DSGE models are not “simpler”. We presented a number of 
arguments that changing two complementary assumptions in financial macroeconomics is 
more “fruitful”: more precise predictions, wider area of prediction and more additional lines 
for further research.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Because the cost of the recession (which increases with the persistence and/or the duration of 
the crisis) is much larger than expected, the ex ante benign neglect of central banks of the 
building up period of the bubble is now challenged. If the ex-post cost of financial crisis is 
very large, it is useful to spend sizeable resources against asset price bubbles in advance. 
 
Sixty years after, we share the same personal view as Friedman (1953, p. 41-43): “Some part 
of economic theory clearly deserves more confidence than others... The weakest and least 
satisfactory part of current economic theory seems to me to be in the field of monetary 
dynamics, which is concerned with the process of adaptation of the economy as a whole to 
changes in conditions and so with short-period fluctuations in aggregate activity.” As for 
now, we do not know yet to which extent the forthcoming macroeconomic theory will take 
into account a weakly regulated financial sector and the rejection of the efficient capital 
market hypothesis. However, we are disturbed by the presentiment that we are on the eve of 
failing once again to arrive there, and that key complementary assumptions in the current way 
of doing mainstream macroeconomics may not be changed for a long time, although they may 
provide better prediction and better explanation.  
 
What we suggest is to be less dogmatic in the requirement for certain assumptions in 
macroeconomic modelling that restrict the outcomes of the economic models too much to 
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explain the volatility of asset prices, recurrent financial crises and depressions in a world with 
weakly regulated banks. 
 
Finally, let us broaden the perspective. To focus only on macroeconomic policies is likely to 
be too narrow in order to understand the world economy with weakly regulated international 
finance. Fruitful research would have to investigate the interplay between innovative 
macroeconomic policy, relevant or feasible banking and financial regulatory policy at the 
microeconomic or financial institutions level, and political economy issues dealing with the 
competition between international jurisdictions and dealing with the distribution of income 
and losses among different groups of economics agents. 
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